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Abstract
Three variations of experience identified in the educational literature entail different ways of thinking
about and developing learners’ imaginations. The relationship between these different imaginative
modes resembles shifts between different kinds of understanding in Kieran Egan’s theory of imaginative development. From this theoretical collision, a new framework emerges that gives greater weight
to the connections between experience and imagination, and that may help to guide new forms of
democratic educational practice.
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W

e live in an age and in a culture when
young people may spend more time interacting with electronic devices than with one
another, let alone with the more-than-human world. Primary or
firsthand experience risks becoming a dwindling resource in the
face of the great flood of secondhand information that flows daily
through the modern media. Learning to deal critically and
intelligently with the latter is self-evidently an important facet of
democratic education. But what of the former? What, exactly, is the
educational value of experience? And are particular varieties of
experience more essential than others for the building of a living
democracy? How might we think strategically and creatively about
the embedding of experience in the process of schooling? These are
the kinds of questions I hope to shed light on in this essay.
My initial engagement with these issues arose from my work
with Canadian indigenous organizations on the problem of
language maintenance and revitalization (e.g., Fettes, 1992; Fettes &
Norton, 2000). Around the world, local languages are being lost at
an ever-increasing rate, with far-reaching consequences for human
cultural diversity and development (Nettle & Romaine, 2000) and,
more broadly, for ecocultural health (Rapport & Maffi, 2011). At the
heart of what is being lost are locally sensitive ways of understanding human embeddedness in the more-than-human world (Abram,
1997). Responses to language loss that focus on language alone miss
this key point: Indigenous languages derive much of their meaning
from their responsiveness to ecologically and historically particular
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shared experiences of place and being. The relationship between
experience and language thus becomes an extremely important
question for educators who see cultural diversity as a value and a
resource, whether on grounds of equity, inclusion, critique, or
sustainability.
Yet teasing out that relationship is a complex task. Language is
a problematic enough term in and of itself (Fettes, 1997, 2003);
experience is at least equally fraught with ambiguity, as experiential
educator Fox (2008) observed in a thoughtful meditation:
What exactly is experience? Whose experience is heard? . . . Think for
a moment: When does an experience begin—at the start of an
activity? Does it include the planning and framing by leaders? What
about the histories and political realities of the participants? What
historical period will we choose? Once the “experience” begins, how
does an individual, observer, researcher, participant, or leader identify
“the” experience? How is an experience demarcated from the flow of
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life? How is any experience framed by the participant, leader, society,
culture, or educational program? Who gets to say what is important
about an experience? What if the leader and participant frame it
differently? (p. 39)

The American pragmatists James and Dewey took experience
to constitute the basic reality of human existence, more or less
synonymous with being. But they fully acknowledged its complexity, James (1904) referring to “a quasi-chaos” (“Substitution,” para. 2)
and Dewey (1916/2008) to “a single continuous interaction of a great
diversity (literally countless in number) of energies” (p. 174). Such
complexity emerges not only from the many different kinds of
experience open to human beings but also to the countless ways
such experiences can be understood, through what James (1904)
called “substitutional experience” but we more routinely refer to as
acts of interpretation. The meaning of experience is not simply
given once and for all in the experience itself. Rather, experience
feeds what Polanyi (1974) called “personal knowledge” (direct, tacit,
embodied knowledge that develops through dwelling in the world)
and “reflective knowledge” (explicit, linguified knowledge that
draws on cultural/cognitive tools shared through our social
discourse networks). There is, as philosopher Zwicky observed (as
cited in Dickinson & Goulet, 2010), an “extraordinary tension” (p.
143) between these kinds of knowing—one that runs through all of
the questions posed by Fox, above. The meaning of experience is
never just individual and idiosyncratic but also profoundly
collective and cultural. Because of this, it is always open to elaboration and contestation; and this process, as Dewey saw, lies at the
heart of education in a democratic society.
From my initial interest in linguistic and cultural diversity,
then, my inquiry has broadened to include more general questions.
How do learners make sense of experience? How can they come,
over time, to do so more richly, more insightfully, more productively? And how can educators guide such learning as effectively
and inclusively as possible? In agreement with Fox, I see both
theoretical and heuristic value in addressing these questions
through “alternative taxonomic strategies” (Fox, 2008, p. 49)—
ways of conceptualizing distinctive kinds of educational meaning
offered by experience. Such strategies should point to different
ways of structuring and mediating experience—that is, they should
encourage new forms of educational practice—and they should
also suggest new questions to ask about the educational process.
My approach is a somewhat circuitous one. I begin by
introducing philosophical work on the role of imagination in
education (Egan, 1997), which provides interesting insights into
the reflective (making-sense-through-language) kinds of understanding we are concerned with. I then orchestrate a collision
between this framework and Roberts’s (2008) notion of “variations
of experience,” which speaks more directly to our tacit (dwelling-
in-the-world) kinds of understanding. While this theoretical
reconstruction occupies most of the available space, whenever
possible I suggest how such a framework may serve to “enrich
research and nourish practice” (Fox, 2008, p. 52), both inside and
outside of schools.
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Imagination and Understanding
Educators interested in experience have rarely shown much
interest in the imagination, and vice versa. This is somewhat
curious, since the imagination has long been regarded in Western
philosophy as a kind of intermediary between the world of the
senses and the world of thought (Brann, 1993; Jay, 2004). The
transformation of experience into meaning represents a kind of
alchemy that imagination should, somehow, be involved in. Yet the
imagination has not been a welcome guest in the institutions of
classical or “solid” modernity. If one thinks of education in terms of
desired and reliable outcomes, as our industrial civilization tends
to do, one is likely to gravitate toward pedagogies that avoid
surprises. So it is that imagination has rarely made an appearance
in writing on formal schooling outside the domain of the arts (e.g.,
Greene, 1995).
In the last few years, however, imagination has emerged as an
educational concern for scholars grounded in mythopoetics
(Leonard & Willis, 2008), Jungian psychology (Jones, Clarkson,
Congram, & Stratton, 2008), Steiner schooling (Nielsen, 2004),
and creative approaches to mainstream classroom teaching
(Blenkinsop, 2009; Egan, 2005; Egan & Madej, 2010; Egan, Stout, &
Takaya, 2007; Judson, 2008; Nielsen, Fitzgerald, & Fettes, 2010),
among others. These various approaches are only loosely connected with one another, but share
a view of thought and understanding as necessarily embodied,
emotional and contextual as well as linguistic, logical and abstract; a
view of education as necessarily encompassing spirit and mystery as
well as reason, collective consciousness and culture as well as
individual nature; and a view of teaching as a kind of art, to be
cultivated in much the same way as the other arts, involving both the
mastery of medium and technique and the ineffable workings of
intuition, serendipity, and talent. (Fettes, Nielsen, Haralambous, &
Fitzgerald, 2010)

Unique among these diverse approaches is Egan’s cultural-
historical theory of imaginative development. In a number of
works, stretching from Educational Development (1979) to The
Educated Mind (1997), Egan has suggested that we view human
history as a process of coming to terms with the imaginative
possibilities of language. He picks out, in particular, four dramatic
cultural transformations: the development of oral language, the
rise of literate societies, the establishment of communities of
theoretic discourse and, most recently, the emergence of deep
epistemic doubt. Each of these cultural discoveries, he argues,
provided a new set of tools for engaging the imagination in making
sense of the world; from the use of those tools, four distinctively
languaged kinds of understanding emerged (in order: Mythic,
Romantic, Philosophic, and Ironic) that continue to shape our
cultures and our minds today. Child development recapitulates this
process through the gradual, sequential appropriation of these
different sets of cognitive tools. This is, however, far from an
automatic or unproblematic process, and schools in their present
form tend to be more of a hindrance than a help. As a remedy, Egan
has offered a number of principles, frameworks, and examples,
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most recently under the label of “imaginative education” (e.g. Egan,
2005), intended to help teachers foster the development of Mythic,
Romantic, or Philosophic understanding—the kinds of greatest
relevance for the years of schooling (Egan, 1986, 1990, 1992, 1997,
2005, 2006).
I turn in a moment to the role of embodiment and experience
in Egan’s theory, but it may be helpful first to summarize these
practical aspects of his approach. My take on it is based not only on
Egan’s own published work but on a decade of working with
teachers in workshops, courses, and research projects to put his
ideas into practice. Here are what I see as the most distinctive
features of imaginative education, Egan-style:
• Conceptualize the learning experience as a narrative co-created
by the learners (Egan, 1988, Spring). Typically this involves a
journey from an initial source of wonder about or mystery in a
topic toward some kind of resolution that the learners themselves
discover or create. Elsewhere I have described one particular
narrative model that I have found useful in helping teachers plan
this process (Fettes, 2011).
• Build each curricular narrative less on a logical sequence of ideas
than on a central emotional tension (or imaginative theme) that
helps dramatize the topic. Egan typically describes this in terms of
“binary opposites” (if the object is to develop Mythic understanding) or “heroic qualities” (Romantic)—for instance, basing a unit
on properties of the air on the binary empty/full (Egan, 1997, pp.
244−251) or a unit on the life cycle of eels on the heroic quality of
persistence (Egan, 1992 pp. 93−102).
• Look for vivid, dramatic images, metaphors, and stories that
connect with the central imaginative theme. Plan a variety of ways
in which students can engage with these throughout the unit,
actively as well as passively.
• Look for ways to incorporate cognitive tools that are likely to
engage the imaginations of your particular students when you’re
planning learning activities. Egan lists numerous examples of
such tools in the context of the different kinds of understanding;
for instance, the playful use of rhyme and rhythm can be useful in
developing Mythic understanding, while the urge to collect and
organize sets of things is equally characteristic of Romantic
understanding (Egan, 1986, 1992, 1997, 2005; Fettes, 2010).
• Work to keep each kind of understanding active. Mythic understanding tends to dominate up to about age seven, Romantic from
eight to fourteen, but the point is neither to remain content with
these nor to leave them behind; rather, they should be seen as
essential underpinnings to the development of Philosophic
understanding through the teenage years and Ironic understanding through adulthood.
Egan’s emphasis on planning frameworks can give the
misleading impression that they alone lead to imaginative teaching
and learning. A better way of putting it is that they can help
teachers see new imaginative possibilities in what they do, that we
can make imaginative engagement a central aim of classroom
teaching, allowing teachers and students alike to tap into the
emotional and intellectual energy it provides. The actual work of
teaching remains a difficult, multifaceted challenge, but it becomes
more exciting, successful, and rewarding when it works with the
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imagination rather than ignoring it or, worse, treating it as a
problem.
Egan’s work encourages thoughtfulness and innovation in
dealing with the content of the curriculum, but he has relatively
little to say about how to work in the world of movement and
sensation and social interaction. His principal interest is in the way
that modes of language use influence our general imaginative take
on the world. This linguistic bias is apparent in his developmental
scheme, where Somatic understanding—the kind of understanding
I referred to earlier as tacit, embodied knowledge—is relegated to
the earliest years, before oral language takes over our processes of
meaning-making. Of course, Egan is aware that this mode of
understanding doesn’t disappear, and in The Educated Mind (1997)
he highlighted its importance for the flexible, reflexive understanding he called Ironic: the acme of his educational theory. Yet its role
in the crucial years of schooling has been largely ignored.
Nonetheless, if we are looking for a theory of educational
experience, there are some promising features of Egan’s account.
By situating educational development within culture and history,
it helps us avoid the trap Fox pointed to, of treating experience as
if it were somehow sealed off from all our inherited baggage of
meaning-making. More specifically, Egan’s framework suggests—in agreement with Vygotskian psychology (Kozulin, 1998;
Vygotsky, 1986, 1987)—that our ways of thinking about the world
undergo significant transformation as learners pick up, use, and
internalize the cognitive tools of our culture. If Egan’s kinds of
understanding represent different stages or aspects of this
restructuring, perhaps our ways of making sense of experience
undergo similar shifts. This holds out the appealing prospect of a
developmental theory that doesn’t keep language at arm’s length
from our physical and ecological embeddedness in the world, but
embraces both as essential, interlinked aspects of the unfolding of
our human selves.
Pursuing this idea, I was struck by echoes of Egan’s kinds of
understanding in the three educational variations of experience
identified by Roberts (2008), following up on insights in Jay’s
pioneering cultural study Songs of Experience (2004). According to
Roberts, there are three distinctive conceptions of experience that
have been influential in the development of Western educational
traditions: “interactive experience, drawn from pragmatist philosophy; embodied experience, drawn from Romanticism and phenomenology; and experience as praxis, drawn from critical theory”
(p. 21). As I dug deeper into the educational thinking underlying
each of these variations, I came to see them as representing
somewhat distinct imaginative modes of meaning-making, related
to each other in the same fashion as Egan’s Mythic, Romantic, and
Philosophic kinds of understanding relate to one another. Table 1
depicts the general set of relationships involved.
In the following sections, I work upwards through the table,
locating each mode of engagement and kind of understanding in
the educational literature, explaining its relationship to Egan’s
development theory, and tracing some practical implications of the
framework.
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Table 1. Modes and pathways of imaginative development
Mode of Engagement

Encounter-Driven

Language-Driven

IMPLICATION

Endemic: Imaginative understanding
through situated engagement

Philosophic: Imaginative understanding through disciplined inquiry

REALIZATION

Harmonic: Imaginative understanding through purposeful engagement

Romantic: Imaginative understanding through popular
literacy

PARTICIPATION

Somatic: Imaginative understanding
through bodily engagement

Mythic: Imaginative understanding through oral storying

Imagination and Embodied Experience
Of Roberts’s three variations of experience, the first one I tackle is
exemplified by certain kinds of wilderness education, notably
solos, vision quests, and other highly individualized and transcendent encounters with the more-than-human. We see its imaginative dimension eloquently expounded by Emerson (1906a, b),
perhaps the most influential North American proponent of this
way of encountering the world. Here is how he put it in his widely
read essay “Nature” (1906b):
To speak truly, few adult persons can see nature. Most persons do not
see the sun. At least they have a very superficial seeing. The sun
illuminates only the eye of the man, but shines into the eye and the
heart of the child. The lover of nature is he whose inward and outward
senses are still truly adjusted to each other; who has retained the spirit
of infancy even into the era of manhood. His intercourse with heaven
and earth, becomes part of his daily food. In the presence of nature, a
wild delight runs through the man, in spite of real sorrows. . . .
Crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at twilight, under a
clouded sky, without having in my thoughts any occurrence of special
good fortune, I have enjoyed a perfect exhilaration. I am glad to the
brink of fear. (pp. 6−7)

For Emerson (1836b), however, such direct and intense
experience of nature was good not only for its own sake; it was also
a source of intellectual depth. “We know more from nature than we
can at will communicate. Its light flows into the mind evermore,
and we forget its presence. . . . Every object, rightly seen, unlocks a
new faculty of the soul” (pp. 29, 33). In short, he concluded, “The
Imagination may be defined to be, the use which the Reason makes
of the material world” (p. 50).
This conception, and the language in which it is expressed,
bear clear affinities with the thinking of English Romantics such as
Wordsworth and Coleridge. All of them saw education as leading,
in general, to a shuttering of sensibility, a closing of the doors of
perception, which could best be combated by imaginative encounters with living nature: “To me the meanest flower that blows can
give/Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears” (Wordsworth,
1919, lines 207–208). To this school of thought, imagination is
necessary for depth perception; it provides a bridge between the
“inward and outward senses” (Emerson, 1836b, p. 7) that yields not
only delight but understanding. And this depth is to be found
primarily in the world of direct experience, toward which poetry
and other forms of language merely gesture.
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As Roberts (2008) noted, a contemporary (and philosophically sophisticated) version of these ideas can be found in Abram’s
The Spell of the Sensuous (1997). Abram referred to the imagination
only briefly in this book, but it is enough to confirm the affinity
between his thinking and Emerson’s:
The perceiving body . . . gregariously participates in the activity of the
world, lending its imagination to things in order to see them more
fully. . . . Imagination is not a separate mental faculty (as we so often
assume) but is rather the way the senses themselves have of throwing
themselves beyond what is immediately given, in order to make
tentative contact with the other sides of things that we do not sense
directly, with the hidden or invisible aspects of the sensible. And yet
such sensory anticipations and projections are not arbitrary; they
regularly respond to suggestions offered by the sensible itself. (p. 58)

For Abram, citing the phenomenological philosopher
Merleau-Ponty, “all of the creativity and free-ranging mobility
that we have come to associate with the human intellect is, in
truth, an elaboration, or recapitulation, of a profound creativity
already underway at the most immediate level of sensory
perception” (Abram, 1997, p. 49). It follows, of course, that when
we cut ourselves off from direct immersion in the natural world,
in rich sensory experience, we cripple our ability to think
creatively and well.
In this light, language does not appear simply as a modest
handmaiden to such “profound creativity” (Abram, 1997, p. 49) but
as its potential enemy. “The map is not the territory,” as Korzybski
(1958, p. 750) famously observed; if we come to base our understanding of the world on how we talk about it, we may well lose
touch with what that world really feels (and smells and tastes and
sounds and looks) like. Egan (1997) is alert to this tension, which he
has discussed in terms of the gap between Somatic and all subsequent forms of “languaged understanding” (p. 170). Yet his
proposed resolution—an eventual return to the Somatic in the
context of Ironic understanding—does not go far enough for
educators such as Emerson and Abram, who are at pains to stress
that language can and should be kept in responsive contact with
the world of experience, all the way through the process of
language development and intellectual growth. Emerson (1836b)
referred approvingly (if somewhat quaintly, to modern ears) to
“the conversation of a strong-natured farmer or back-woodsman,
which all men relish” (p. 27) and to the eloquence of “the poet, the
orator, bred in the woods, whose senses have been nourished by
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their fair and appeasing changes, year after year, without design and
without heed” (p. 29). Abram (1997), writing a century and a half
later, placed greater emphasis on the oral cultures of indigenous
peoples, in which “the solidarity between language and the animate
landscape is palpable and evident” (p. 87). The educational ideal, in
each case, is the same: If life is lived in close connection with the
natural world, the living language will reflect that, to its speakers’
lasting benefit.
What characterizes this experience-proximal language? Rich
and precise imagery, according to Emerson; stories and songs “that
have the rhythm and lilt of the local soundscape,” according to
Abram (1997, p. 273)—that is, language that works with the body’s
recollection of sensory encounters with the world. In many
respects, this is the language Egan (1997) viewed as central to the
development of Mythic understanding, a language of embodied
kinship, of embeddedness in the rhythms and contrasts of daily life:
When teaching about the earthworm, for example . . . it is not so much
a matter of seeing the earthworm in terms of our senses as performing
the imaginative act of recognizing earthwormness in ourselves. The
task is imaginatively to incorporate the world rather than simply learn
facts about something “out there.” Similarly, when teaching about
flowers, one could imagine emerging from the cold ground, pushing
towards the light, bursting with a kind of ecstasy in the warmer air,
turning with passion towards the sun, feeling the rush of sap, then
experiencing the horror of the returning cold, and shriveling back
underground. (pp. 61−62)

For Egan, as for Emerson, this kind of vivid use of language
underlies our ability to think powerfully and clearly about abstract
topics, an ability that will later be greatly extended through the
tools of literacy and theoretic reasoning.
If, then, we drop Egan’s insistence on placing Somatic and
Mythic understanding in a developmental sequence and regard
them instead as two aspects of a particular imaginative relationship
with the world, we arrive at an educational ideal much closer to
Emerson’s and Abram’s. In this case one might see all three theorists
as contributing to a theory of imaginative participation, in which
language and experience (or reflective and tacit knowledge) play
contrasting but not incompatible roles. Mythic understanding, in
this alternative interpretation, emerges in response to our desire to
participate fully in our cultural milieu, just as Somatic understanding arises through our wholehearted participation in embodied
experience. In these imaginative modes, our sense of self readily
extends into the world around us: We are, momentarily, the wild
flower nodding by the path, or Little Red Riding Hood venturing
off into the forest; we feel in ourselves the beauty and fragility of the
one, the innocence and courage of the other. The kind of delight felt
in each case, and the intellectual enrichment associated with it, is
much the same.
In a recent paper (Fettes, 2011), I spelled out some of the
educational implications of this idea. One, obviously, is that
Egan’s recommendations for the development of Mythic understanding (e.g., Egan, 1986, 1988, 1997, 2005) need to be complemented by a deliberate cultivation of vivid sensory experience,
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whether the learners are young children (as Egan envisioned) or
older students (including, crucially, preservice teachers:
Chodakowski, 2009; Chodakowski, Egan, Judson, & Stewart,
2011; Fettes, 2005). Perhaps less obviously, the framework also
implies that experiential educators can greatly enhance the
meaningfulness of such firsthand experience by deliberately
enriching and developing the oral language used to describe it,
using Egan’s tools of Mythic understanding. The possibility that
the narrative structuring of educational experience advocated by
Egan can be fruitfully applied in experiential education settings is
also worth exploring (Fettes, 2011).

Imagination and Interactive Experience
The second of Roberts’s variations of experience is found at the
heart of Dewey’s educational (and ethical) theory (Pappas, 2008)
and most concisely articulated in Dewey’s late work Experience and
Education (1938/1998). Influenced initially by Hegel, but later and
more deeply by James, Dewey developed a distinctively North
American brand of radical empiricism that tied all knowledge to
our lived encounters with reality. “Gone were the reliance on
foundations, universal truths, and a quest for certainty. In its place
was a deeply contextual, action-oriented epistemology that allowed
for the contingencies of a changing world” (Roberts, 2008, p. 22).
Fairfield (2009) summed up Dewey’s conception this way:
It is the nature of experience to be at once passive and active, nor
merely to receive sensory input but actively to interpret, categorize,
and transform it in the manner of an experiment directed toward a
pragmatic end. . . . Experience in this sense is life itself, the growth or
being-in-motion of a worldly subjectivity. It is an experience that is
temporal and adaptive, that adjusts itself to objects in the world while
simultaneously transforming them to suit its own purposes and that is
continually growing and expanding. (pp. 65–66)

Dewey’s thought is famously difficult to encapsulate in a
paragraph or two. However, Fairfield was surely right to emphasize
the purposefulness of experience in Dewey’s formulation. In
Experience and Education, Dewey (1938/1998) observed:
All of us have desires, all at least who have not become so pathological
that they are completely apathetic. These desires are the ultimate
moving springs of action. . . . The intensity of the desire measures the
strength of the efforts that will be put forth. But the wishes are empty
castles in the air unless they are translated into the means by which
they may be realized. The question of how soon or of means takes the
place of a projected imaginative end, and, since means are objective,
they have to be studied and understood if a genuine purpose is to be
formed. . . . In an educational scheme, the occurrence of a desire and
impulse is not the final end. It is an occasion and a demand for the
formation of a plan and method of activity. (pp. 82–84)

Here, then, we find a clue to Dewey’s conception of imagination’s
role in directing experience. As for the Romantics, it draws its
energy from our deepest emotions and desires, but Dewey conjoins
this with conscious intention: The imagination engenders
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meaningful experience by conjuring up a wished-for state of affairs
that motivates subsequent action. Of course, for imagination to
perform this role, it must also be intimately connected with our
knowledge of reality, on which we must call to form and carry out a
plan of activity. With this in mind, we can find fresh meaning in the
following points from Dewey’s (1897) famous “Pedagogic Creed,”
four decades distant from Experience and Education, but never
disavowed:
I believe that the image is the great instrument of instruction. What a
child gets out of any subject presented to him is simply the images
which he himself forms with regard to it.
I believe that if nine-tenths of the energy at present directed towards
making the child learn certain things, were spent in seeing to it that
the child was forming proper images, the work of instruction would be
indefinitely facilitated.
I believe that much of the time and attention now given to the
preparation and presentation of lessons might be more wisely and
profitably expended in training the child’s power of imagery and in
seeing to it that he was continually forming definite, vivid, and
growing images of the various subjects with which he comes in contact
in his experience. (The Nature of Method section, para. 7)

If we understand “image” as referring to the active contents of
the imagination, Dewey seems to be conceiving of education as a
kind of imaginative stocking up of firsthand information (Reed,
1996) or personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1974) that enables learners
to discover more possibilities for purposeful action or, conversely,
a process of purposeful action leading to imaginative growth.
Dewey, it must be said, did not use the term imagination extensively or consistently (Fairfield, 2009, p. 118). He did, however, in
the period of his most mature thought, emphasize that it “animates
and pervades all processes of making and observation. It is a way of
seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole”
(Dewey, 1934, p. 267). In this statement we see the two sides of
experience, the active (making) and the passive (observation),
brought together under the one quality of mind. “There is always
some measure of adventure in the meeting of mind and universe,”
Dewey added, “and this adventure is, in its measure, imagination”
(Dewey, 1934, p. 267).
This, then, is a more directed and purposeful conception of
imaginative experience than that of Emerson and Abram. The goal
here is not imaginative participation but imaginative realization:
the pursuit of consciously planned activities for preconceived ends.
The educational adventure consists not in letting one’s awareness
be taken up and shaped by the external world but in grappling with
that world to bring something new into being (something material,
perhaps, but also something intellectual, a new insight into how
that world can manifest itself in our experience). As is well known,
Dewey’s guiding model for the educational process was based on
experimental inquiry, with its rationalist and systematic approach
to discovering deeper patterns and meanings in experience. Art as
Experience makes it clear, however, that he did not see this as
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opposed to an aesthetic mode of understanding. Rather, “intellectual experience . . . must bear an esthetic stamp to be itself complete” (1934, p. 38). For Dewey, the achievement of an end was
integral and necessary to that completeness.
Perhaps curiously, there is nothing in Egan’s theory of
imaginative development that corresponds to this productive and
goal-oriented conception of imagination, even though it is clearly
relevant to many kinds of educational activity. Yet if one thinks of it
as the experiential side of an imaginative mode called Realization,
its connections with Egan’s Romantic understanding become
apparent. The world is seen by the Romantic imagination as a vast
stage for the enactment of human hopes, fears, passions, strivings.
Its concern is with the limits of possibility, with great deeds and
heroic figures, with rebellion and idealism. It is an imaginative style
passionately preoccupied with doing. According to Egan, it
develops out of Mythic understanding in large part because of the
way in which literacy reorganizes our thinking. But we might also
see it as part of a new imaginative project of the self, one that seeks
greater agency and autonomy in the world. As Egan (1997)
observed:
When we are ten, we are very much at the mercy of the world around
us. We are typically subject to endless rules and regulations—parental,
societal, and, not least, natural. . . . The tension characteristic of
romance comes from the desire to transcend a threatening reality
while seeking to secure one’s identity within it.
A characteristic of Romantic understanding, then, is its ready
association with transcendent human qualities, or human qualities
exercised to a transcendent degree. This observation is important for
the education of children from about eight to fifteen because almost
any curriculum material can be made understandable if students can
associate “romantically” with such qualities within it. This is, I might
note in passing, not a matter of manipulating students to learn the
knowledge we “privilege,” but rather a matter of having the courtesy to
attend to how they can best make sense of any knowledge. (p. 90)

Under this this theme of “transcendence within reality,”
Egan grouped such typical adolescent preoccupations as hobbies
and collecting, extremes and limits (such as sporting statistics or
the Guinness Book of World Records), pop culture heroes such as
film or music stars, trivia contests and reality TV shows, and so
on. It is evident that this phase of imaginative development tends
to find its contents in popular culture rather than in the process
of formal education. Similarly, the kind of experiential engagement Dewey saw as most valuable (that is, goal-directed, socially
mediated, imaginative activity motivated by genuine interest)
tends to take place in informal educational settings: sports and
physical recreation, art and craft classes, music, theater, and
dance, and so on. This too grows in importance as children enter
adolescence, becoming for some a vital and lasting source of
meaning in their lives.
We can read Dewey and Egan, then, as urging that formal
education make greater efforts to tap the upwelling of physical,
emotional, and intellectual energy associated with the transition to
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adulthood and the growing importance of agency in the process of
self-development. Consistent with their differing philosophies and
sources of inspiration, Egan has emphasized how this can be done
through language, while Dewey placed the emphasis on experience. Writing in the postmodern era, Egan is more at ease with the
notion of there being differences, tensions, and even ruptures in
our ways of grasping the world; for him, Romantic understanding
is just one facet of our intellectual development, to be appreciated
and applied but not transformed into a single foundational idea.
This was not Dewey’s project; he was after a unified system, a single
epistemology, and this led him to place more faith in one particular
conception of experience than it could reasonably bear (Jay, 2004).
Yet at the center of his thought was a vision of imagination actively
and creatively engaged with the world, and this helps us to see what
is missing in Egan’s emphasis on language as the engine of imaginative development. Taking our cue from the earlier pairing of
Somatic and Mythic understanding, we might think of Romantic
understanding as complemented by an experiential partner, a kind
of understanding that develops when the imagination is involved in
visualizing the consequences of purposeful action. I propose to call
this Harmonic understanding.
This of course is not a concept intended to encompass all of
Dewey’s own philosophy or educational vision. Rather, I seek to
distill what he has to say about the relationship between imagination and experience that is educationally most insightful and
useful, setting this within the context of a process of imaginative
development characterized by losses and gains (Egan, 1997).
Harmonic understanding does entail a greater sense of separation
between self and world than Somatic understanding does, a tension
that can be threatening, daunting, frustrating, but also intriguing,
adventurous, exciting. Like Romantic understanding, Harmonic
understanding encourages a focus on human agency, on the
particularities of individuals and situations, on the limits of
possibility and the quest for excellence, and on the shaping of
islands of order and purpose in a world that resists human intentions. Like Romantic understanding, it has the potential to drift
toward the trivial, unless it is guided by real social interests, the
accumulated wisdom of a tradition or discipline, and the considered judgment of teachers, mentors, or users (Dewey, 1938/1998).
But if it is routinely neglected, as is common in formal schooling,
any skilled task can descend into humdrum imitation or meaningless drudgery.
Referring back to Table 1 may help set these new ideas in the
context of those we have already covered. It is now apparent that the
left-hand column of the table represents a kind of hermeneutic
developmental process: what I have elsewhere called “growing into
the world” (Fettes, 2012). I am suggesting that Participation and
Realization are two of the most fundamental modes we have of
engaging with the world, that this engagement necessarily involves
the imagination, and that it engenders kinds of understanding that
are both tacit/embodied (Somatic and Harmonic) and explicit/
linguified (Mythic and Romantic). Egan has written of the tension
between Mythic and Romantic understanding, as well as the
tension between Mythic and Somatic, and this point can be made
more generally: Every kind of understanding is somewhat at odds
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with all the others. So what we are after, educationally, is not a
gradual ascent toward a single unified understanding of the world.
We are trying, instead, for versatility.
If fully implemented, this would lead to a very different
approach to teaching the later elementary and early high school
grades. A focus on human agency would transform much of the
curriculum into dramatic explorations and reenactments of
invention, discovery, and development; concomitantly, significant
resources would be invested in helping each student develop skills
in one or more areas of handicrafts, physical labor, artistic creation,
or athletic performance. Compared to the Somatic/Mythic curriculum, these units of study would last longer and place a greater
emphasis on meaningful improvement over time. The goal would
be, by early adolescence, to endow each student with a broad
understanding of human capacities and achievement in general,
and personal confidence in his or her own abilities in one or more
valued areas of endeavor.

Imagination and Experience as Praxis
Although Roberts (2008) portrayed “experience as praxis” (p. 21) as
a third (if uncommon) variation within experiential education, his
discussion was more concerned with “the ways in which experience
can be employed for hegemonic purposes” (p. 27) than with the
conception of experience central to the critical tradition. I shall
argue, however, that this conception is indeed distinctive and
educationally relevant in ways that go beyond critique. Of course,
in a tradition as diverse as critical pedagogy (cf., Darder, Baltodano,
& Torres, 2003), to use a metaphor that invokes a center is to invite
immediate rebuttal, and I would not expect this formulation to
please everyone. Nonetheless, if we take Paulo Freire’s ideas and
writings as a basic source of inspiration for a variety of critical
theorists, we can endeavor to trace in them his thinking on the
respective roles of experience and imagination in “the educational
practice of a progressive option” (Freire, 1994, p. 1).
A good starting point is the following key passage in Pedagogy
of the Oppressed:
Since people do not exist apart from the world, apart from reality, the
movement [i.e., the process of educational development] must begin
with the human-world relationship. Accordingly, the point of
departure must always be with men and women in the “here and now,”
which constitutes the situation within which they are submerged, from
which they emerge, and in which they intervene. Only by starting from
this situation—which determines their perception of it—can they
begin to move. To do this authentically they must perceive their state
not as fated and unalterable, but merely as limiting—and therefore
challenging. (Freire, 2000, p. 85)

Freire presented “the situation”—the normal state of affairs in
which most people live—as something static, confining, working
against the existential process of becoming that he equated with
authentic education. It follows that for him, the normal range of
experience that characterizes “the situation” is not truly educational; indeed, because people are “submerged” in it, it is in a sense
antieducational because it normalizes oppression, whether one is
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on the giving or the receiving side of it. The kind of experience that
educators should be aiming for is one that “engages people as
beings aware of their incompletion” and teaches them “to apprehend [their] situation as an historical reality susceptible of
transformation” (Freire, 2003, pp. 84–85).
This process, or movement, brings imagination and experience together in a characteristic way. We can’t begin to see reality
clearly, in the Freirean account, until we have a sense of how it
could be different. This awakening of the imagination, on the other
hand, can’t take place at a remove from experience, for example, in
abstract analysis or rhetoric; it has to be situated as clearly as
possible in the material particulars of people’s lives. This means, in
practice, that education involves dialogue, because ultimately no
one can speak authoritatively on behalf of another’s experience:
Each person must name the world for himself or herself but have
the humility to listen to and learn from others’ acts of naming as
well. And this naming is never just concerned with how things are,
here and now; it reaches toward what utopian philosopher Bloch
called the “not yet” (Giroux & McLaren, 1997, p. 146) and Freire
(2000) called “untested feasibility” (p. 113).
Few have noted how central this imaginative movement is to
Freirean pedagogy (McLaren & De Lissovoy, 2002):
The transformation of social conditions involves a rethinking of the
world as a particular world, capable of being changed. But the
reframing proposed here depends upon the power of the imagination
to see outside, beyond, and against what is. More than a cognitive or
emotional potential, the human imagination, in Freire’s view, is
capable of a radical and productive envisioning that exceeds the limits
of the given. It is in this capacity that everyone’s humanity consists,
and for this reason it can never be the gift of the teacher to the student.
Rather, educator-student and student-educator work together to
mobilize the imagination in the service of creating a vision of a new
society. (p. 902)

Yet it is equally important to visualize the Freirean imagination as embedded in experience, so that this utopian project is
from the beginning an active and particular one, rooted in “a
concrete engagement in mundane reality” (Giroux & McLaren,
1997, p. 151). Going beyond Participation and Realization, the
mode of understanding that Freire was striving for might be
termed imaginative implication. It involves coming to understand both how one’s own situation and customary actions are
implicated in broader social relations (of oppression or liberation) and what different futures may be implied by changing
one’s actions in the present. The principal tools for bringing this
about are one’s fellow human beings, who by bringing their
different life experiences, perspectives, and specialized knowledge to the dialogue help to create new understandings and
possibilities for action.
Those familiar with Dewey will immediately recognize some
familiar themes here, notably in the emphasis on dialogue as a
cardinal principle of genuine education—dialogue that engages
teachers as much as students (Fairfield, 2009, pp. 42–43). Yet Freire
was willing to go much further in asserting the transformative
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potential of education. Where Dewey thought in terms of a gradual
adjustment of the students’ understanding, Freire was more
interested in qualitative shifts, when reality is suddenly viewed
through new eyes. For Dewey, our grasp on the world grows
through the accumulation of many particular insights, solutions to
concrete problems we are confronted with. For Freire (2000), the
concrete problems are only instances of something much more
profound, which he termed “revolutionary praxis” (p. 131) and
which requires a deeper insight into the underlying structures of
experience:
People will be truly critical if they live the plenitude of the praxis, that
is, if their action encompasses a critical reflection which increasingly
organizes their thinking and thus leads them to move from a purely
naïve knowledge of reality to a higher level, one which enables them to
perceive the causes of reality. (p. 131)

The movement that Freire described closely resembles the
transition, in Egan’s scheme of imaginative development, from
Romantic to Philosophic understanding. Noting Warnock’s (1976)
remark that “imagination can stretch out towards what imagination cannot comprehend” (p. 58), Egan (1997) argued that the
powerful urge to build causal models of reality “follows the stretch
of the imagination and the subsequent construction of the
linguistic and conceptual tools required to secure the mind’s hold
on what the imagination grasped towards” (p. 123). Such a move, he
suggested, is inherently reflexive:
The romantic perspective on history or on the social or natural worlds
focused the younger student’s mind on the extremes, on the more
fascinating facts, on vivid true stories, dramatic events, heroes, and so
on. The Romantic student recognizes, of course, that all these bright
bits and pieces are parts of the one real world, but the connections
between them are not particularly interesting. The new theoretic
language [of Philosophic understanding] helps to generate, or is a
symptom of, a significantly different perspective in which the bright
bits and pieces are seen increasingly as parts of general wholes,
systems, and processes. History, for example, is no longer perceived
primarily as a set of vivid events, styles of living, and heroic characters
but rather as a single complex process, a continuum of styles, examples
of the possible range of human behaviour and human nature. The
connections among things come increasingly into prominence, and the
Philosophic students’ connection with things comes increasingly from
the realization that they themselves are parts of the complex processes
and systems that make up the world. (pp. 120-121)

The utopian urge in Freire’s conception of experience finds its
equivalent, in the Philosophic imagination, in the quest for the
perfect theory, the great explanatory principle: “Establishing the
truth about history, society, and the cosmos is serious business.
When Philosophic understanding dominates the mind, it can work
with powerful intensity” (Egan, 1997, p. 125). An important
dimension of educating for Implication, then, is to challenge the
inevitable weaknesses and limitations in our understanding, giving
rise to an endless process of imaginative growth in which no truth
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is ever fixed or immutable, but overarching visions and theories of
reality still play an essential role. Both Egan and Freire may be
termed critical realists in this sense (see Morrow & Torres, 2002, on
Freire), even though neither goes to great lengths to justify his
epistemology or ontology.
Since critical realism is also a viable philosophy for the natural
sciences (Bhaskar, 1997), it is perhaps not surprising that there are
resonances between Freire’s conception of experience and that
which holds for the wildlife biologist, the expert naturalist, the field
geologist, and so on. For people immersed in the more-than-
human world, each encounter with reality speaks of a web of
connections that can only be grasped through extensive direct
experience, in which intuition and imagination may be aided by all
kinds of descriptive and theoretical tools. Developing such
understanding is part and parcel of developing a kind of rootedness
or at-homeness in the world, reflected in the way Freire emphasized
people’s rootedness in their families, communities, and “situations.”
Accordingly, I propose to call this kind of imaginative engagement
with experience Endemic understanding. In its most common
biological meaning, endemic refers to a species that is native to a
particular area, with an etymology that goes back to Greek demos,
“people (of a place).” But we might also read it as end-emic, that is,
as a term describing the understanding that comes with such
“insiderness” (endos). Endemic understanding, in this sense,
develops through the effort of the imagination to grasp the deep
structures underlying experience and how one is implicated in
them—not just in Freirean pedagogy but in all forms of endeavor
that entail a long-term experiential engagement with wholes,
systems and processes. Fesmire’s (2010) conception of “ecological
imagination” and Ingold’s (2000) discussion of the role of imagination in developing a “dwelling perspective” are examples of contemporary writers (a philosopher and an anthropologist, respectively)
grappling with closely related ideas.
Both Freirean and Deweyan pedagogies have been sternly
criticized for their supposed lack of appreciation for local identities
and traditions, and hence antiecological bias (Bowers, 2006). The
perspective developed here is more positive. In so far as those
pedagogies contribute to the development of Harmonic and
Endemic understanding, by insisting on the value of learners’ direct
engagement with purposeful action and situated dwelling-in-the-
world, they are compatible with the development of a deep ethical
relationality with that world. But this is a more complex task than
affirming people’s right to name the world for themselves or
nurturing their involvement in collective action. It is necessary to
strive to understand the Philosophic ideas and principles that
underlie present social and economic realities, in order to develop
ecologically informed alternatives that can compete for people’s
hearts and minds. There is no getting around the importance of
Philosophic understanding for grasping how the world might be
different than it is. On the other hand, Philosophic understanding
in and of itself can be deracinated and deracinating, and there is no
substitute for a Freirean-situated existential praxis in bringing it
down to earth. This is the function Egan attributed to Somatic
understanding in The Educated Mind; the framework in Table 1
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implies a more robust set of educational strategies to accomplish
the same end.
As in the case of Realization, the development of imaginative
Implication requires significant changes to our educational
institutions. For one thing, a different time scale is involved. Just
as the development of Harmonic and Romantic understanding
takes place over longer time periods than are needed for meaningful Somatic or Mythic development, Endemic and Philosophic
understanding need longer periods still, measured in years rather
than months or weeks. Rather than carving up the high school
curriculum into small chunks defined by their disciplinary
content, it would make more sense to treat it as a voyage through
intellectual history and at the same time an exploration of place,
community, and identity—with the tension between the two
made explicit and problematic, as a defining feature of democratic
schooling in the 21st century. The framework also calls into
question much of what currently passes for environmental
education: Without a commitment to Freirean dialogue about
daily lived experience, and ultimately to “the plenitude of the
praxis” (Freire, 2003, p. 131), understanding of our ecological
Implication remains fragmentary and shallow rather than
Endemic—confirming rather than reforming our unsustainable
and unreflective ways of living in the world.

An Integrative Framework
We know that ethnicity, class, gender, location, and other social
factors have a major impact on educational outcomes in the formal
school system. Experiential educators have long seen one of their
roles as leveling the playing field—making meaningful educational
opportunities available to marginalized learners. I want to suggest
that they accomplish this, in part, by mediating the growth of
imaginative understanding and that such growth is not restricted to
outdoor and other nonformal educational settings. Within the
broader framework outlined above, phenomenological, Deweyan,
Freirean, and imaginative educators might find common cause
with each other and with other traditions barely touched on here:
ecological, indigenous, arts-based and spiritual, among others.
This kind of general integrative scheme should not be taken as
a substitute for these individual traditions. There is a depth of
understanding that comes with particularity, for instance in the
Waldorf school tradition inaugurated by Rudolf Steiner, which
ranges across all of the kinds of understanding described here and
goes into areas that I have left unexplored. What I hope to do is
create a more fertile ground for conversation, collaboration, and
mutual enrichment among communities of scholarship and
practice that often display little awareness of or interest in one
another. Egan’s work, for instance, though recognized through various scholarly and professional awards, is rarely seriously critiqued
or engaged with in the context of other educational traditions. This
is not a situation that helps us address the urgent need for new
models of education and schooling in an unsustainable (and
undemocratic) global civilization.
The framework I have proposed is a fiction, of course.
Establishing these different categories of tacit and explicit
understanding is a way of getting a handle on the “quasi-chaos”
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(James, 1904, “Substitution,” para. 2) of human life, of thinking
more systematically and strategically about what we are trying to
achieve as educators and how we go about it. The way to approach
such a scheme, in my view, is to see what kinds of questions and
practice it provokes—that is, to put it to an experiential test. I
have found Egan’s work very useful for teachers and schools,
albeit with some modification and elaboration; I hope that this
extension of his ideas proves generative for others. Underlying it
is the same tragicomic sensibility that has always impressed me in
Egan’s work. Rather than a triumphant journey up and up to
some gleaming summit, education becomes a tale of gains and
losses, struggles and imperfections, while holding out the
possibility of a deeper and more joyful engagement with the
world for any learner at any age. In the end, to my mind, that is
what democratic education seeks to achieve.
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